Palantir Technologies in policing
Every deployment of Palantir Technologies technology by a law enforcement or justice body currently recorded on the tracker, across 3 countries. Each entry is tied to a published source and carries the date it was last checked.
A deployment can involve more than one supplier. This page indexes entries where Palantir Technologies is the principal named supplier; the full vendor detail on each entry below remains the fuller answer.
Deployments
DE Hesse, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia state police Data Integration and Link Analysis (Palantir Gotham) Operational
- Legal basis
- State police laws. On 16 February 2023 the Federal Constitutional Court held the enabling provisions in Hessian and Hamburg police law unconstitutional in their then form, ruling that automated analysis of stored data is itself an interference with informational self-determination requiring a proportionate legal threshold.
- Oversight
- Federal Constitutional Court; state legislatures and state data protection authorities
Hesse has operated hessenDATA since 2017, with automated access to police information, case management and preventive data systems, telecoms and radio-cell data, mobile phone forensic extractions and police telex traffic, plus social network data subject to prior court order. Bavaria's VeRA went live on 25 December 2024 after pilot operation, with roughly 100 uses reported by May 2025. North Rhine-Westphalia operates DAR and Baden-Württemberg had planned adoption. The Constitutional Court described the capability as able to generate new suspicions and information police had no prior grounds to look for, and potentially to build movement, behavioural, relationship and personality profiles or machine-generated dangerousness assessments in the manner of predictive policing. The Bundesrat has called for a jointly financed federal interim platform. Critics note that while source code sits on German servers there is no assurance copies cannot be moved to the United States, and that Palantir was reportedly given unrestricted access to Bavarian police files for integration.
Source: Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment 1 BvR 1547/19; Deutsche Welle; heise · last checked 2026-08-26
US US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Immigration Case Management and Targeting (Palantir) Operational
- Legal basis
- Sole-source federal contracts; no dedicated statute
- Oversight
- No dedicated regulator; Congressional oversight letter sent April 2026 by Rep. Dan Goldman and colleagues
Three related Palantir systems for ICE: (1) ICM, case management, $139.3m contract from 2022 renewed sole-source, combined deal reportedly exceeding $145m; (2) ImmigrationOS, a ~$30m no-bid 2025 contract modification providing 'near real-time visibility into instances of self-deportation' and managing the 'end to end immigration lifecycle'; (3) ELITE, an app generating deportation-target dossiers with a confidence score (out of 100) on a target's address. In M-J-M-A v Wamsley (D. Oregon), ICE officers confirmed under oath on 2 Dec 2025 that ELITE was used to identify arrest targets during Oregon raids driven by daily arrest quotas -- sworn testimony, stronger evidence than surrounding reporting. 404 Media reported ELITE drawing on HHS/Medicaid data; Palantir disputes this characterisation as misleading. A CMS-ICE data-sharing agreement exists; a preliminary injunction (Aug 2025) briefly blocked sharing in 20 states before a Dec 2025 ruling allowed some sharing to resume pending the case. Same vendor as this site's existing Palantir Gotham entry for German state police, where a Federal Constitutional Court judgment constrains automated analysis -- the US deployment has essentially the inverse legal position: no court constraint, sole-source contracts, and an operational target list rather than an investigative link chart.
Source: ACLU; American Immigration Council; court filings in M-J-M-A v Wamsley · last checked 2026-08-26
DK Rigspolitiet (Danish National Police) POL-INTEL cross-domain police analysis platform Operational
- Legal basis
- Rigspolitiet is named on its own website as data controller for POL-INTEL, which is regulated by executive order; chapter 4 of that order sets out when information held in POL-INTEL is deleted.
The Danish National Police's own page on its processing of personal data establishes that POL-INTEL exists, that Rigspolitiet is its data controller, that it is used to carry out cross-cutting information analyses in support of police work, and that it is regulated by an executive order governing deletion. Everything beyond that comes from secondary sources and is flagged as such. The Danish public-sector AI registry offentlig-ai.dk, read in this run, names Palantir Technologies Inc. as supplier, dates operation to 2017, describes a 'SmartSpot' function for identifying areas at higher risk of crime, lists the police registers the platform draws on including POLSAS case management, the vehicle register, criminal records and the national photograph register, and records that as of 2023 work was under way to add telephone data, ANPG number plate records and passport and driving licence registers. The same registry states that police do not use algorithms for profiling or prediction of crime at individual level. The 'since' field is left empty because 2017 rests on that registry alone and no police or ministry publication establishing the date was readable in this run: the Danish Ministry of Justice press release on the system is blocked to automated fetching at the robots.txt layer, and the Folketing Legal Affairs Committee answers on Palantir software returned 403. Those parliamentary answers are the obvious way to settle both the date and the supplier.
Source: Danish National Police (politi.dk) · last checked 2026-09-06