Borders and immigration

AI at borders covers three different things: checking identities at e-gates and in visa processing, scoring travellers and applications for risk, and immigration enforcement tapping into surveillance built for other purposes.

Guide

What it is

  • Biometric identity checks facial recognition at e-gates and fingerprint and iris matching in visa and asylum processing, comparing a person with their own document.
  • Automated risk assessment systems that score or triage travellers, visa applications or asylum claims for human attention.
  • Borrowed surveillance immigration agencies using data from systems such as city licence plate networks.

How it is used

E-gates and visa biometrics are the most established uses. In the US, federal agencies have obtained plate-reader data from city networks and contracted directly with Clearview AI. The record tracks border systems, data-sharing arrangements and the challenges to them.

Key tensions

Approved for one purpose, used for another

An Illinois audit found US Customs and Border Protection had access to state plate data despite a law restricting sharing for immigration. Mountain View, California ended its contract after federal agencies accessed its cameras without its knowledge.

Scraped faces

Clearview AI's database is built from images taken from the web. Regulators in Canada, the UK and Australia found its collection unlawful, but that does not affect US federal contracts.

Weaker feedback

Border powers are wider and data protection has immigration exemptions. Those affected are often non-citizens with little ability to complain, so few complaints may not mean few errors.

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In depth

The full guide, about 4 minutes to read.

What AI at the border actually covers

Border and immigration technology tends to get discussed as a single subject, but it covers at least three quite different things, with different risks attached to each.

The first is biometric identity verification: facial recognition at automated e-gates, fingerprint and iris matching in visa and asylum processing. This is the most mature and, in narrow technical terms, the least contested application. It is a one-to-one matching problem, comparing a person against a document they have presented, which is a substantially easier task than picking a face out of a crowd.

The second is automated risk assessment: systems that score or triage travellers, visa applications or asylum claims to direct human attention. This is closer to the predictive policing debate, and carries similar questions about what the training data actually encodes.

The third is the one that has produced the most documented controversy recently, and it is not really a border technology at all. It is immigration enforcement gaining access to surveillance infrastructure built and paid for by someone else, for a different stated purpose.

Surveillance built for one purpose, used for another

Automated licence plate reader networks in the US are largely commercial products bought by individual cities and police departments, most prominently from Flock Safety, whose network is reported to cover more than 5,000 law enforcement agencies. The stated purpose at the point of purchase is typically local: stolen vehicles, serious crime investigation, missing persons.

An Illinois state audit found that federal agencies including US Customs and Border Protection had obtained access to state plate-read data through an undisclosed pilot arrangement, in apparent tension with an Illinois law restricting data sharing for immigration enforcement purposes. Illinois subsequently removed 47 agencies from data access. Separately, the police chief in Mountain View, California disclosed to the city council that federal agencies had accessed the city's camera data without the city's knowledge; the council voted unanimously to terminate the contract.

What makes these cases significant is the mechanism rather than the individual facts. A city council approving a plate reader contract is making a judgement about a specific, bounded local purpose. If the resulting database can subsequently be queried by agencies the council never contemplated, for purposes it never approved, then the consent it gave was for something narrower than what it actually got. Both cases are recorded with full sourcing on the deployment tracker, and the underlying system is covered on the Flock Safety ALPR page.

Direct contracting for facial recognition

Immigration authorities have also bought facial recognition capability outright. Clearview AI, whose database is assembled from images scraped from the public web, has reported contracts with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, with US Customs and Border Protection, and with a US Army special operations command.

The significance here is what Clearview's database is. Unlike a passport or visa photo held for an identity-verification purpose, a scraped web image was never provided by the subject for any government use at all. Privacy regulators in Canada, the UK and Australia each separately found the company's collection practices breached their national law and ordered it to stop gathering their citizens' images. Those findings did not stop the company operating in the US, and they carry no weight over a US federal contract. The system is covered in more detail on the Clearview AI page.

Why the oversight picture differs from domestic policing

Border and immigration functions commonly sit under a different legal framework from ordinary policing. Powers at the border are frequently wider, the threshold for exercising them lower, and data protection regimes often contain explicit carve-outs on immigration control or national security grounds. In the UK, the exemption in data protection law relating to immigration control has been the subject of sustained legal challenge for precisely this reason.

There is also an asymmetry in who is affected. The people subject to these systems are disproportionately non-citizens, who may have fewer practical routes to contest an adverse decision, less standing to bring a challenge, and in some cases a strong incentive not to draw attention to themselves at all. A system whose errors are mostly experienced by people poorly placed to complain about them will generate fewer complaints, and a low complaint rate is easily mistaken for a low error rate.

That is not an argument that these systems are necessarily wrong. Border control is a legitimate state function and identity verification is a legitimate part of it. It is an argument that the feedback mechanisms which surface problems in domestic policing, complaints, litigation, press coverage and regulator intervention, all operate more weakly here, so the absence of visible controversy is weaker evidence of a well-functioning system than it would be elsewhere.

Where the rules sit

There is no single instrument governing AI at borders. In the UK the relevant framework is assembled from data protection law and its immigration exemption, human rights law, the Equality Act, and the Home Office's own policies. In the EU, the AI Act designates several migration and border management uses as high risk, which will bring specific obligations once those provisions take effect, though the interaction between those obligations and existing national security carve-outs is still being worked through. The timing matters here too: the EU's Digital Omnibus package pushed back the start date for high-risk obligations generally from August 2026 to December 2027, so these border and migration specific duties are not yet in force. In the US, there is no comprehensive federal framework, and the most consequential constraints to date have come from state legislatures, as in Illinois and Washington State.

Records on the tracker

Open the full tracker

37 records on borders and immigration, most recently checked first: 33 in use now, 1 withdrawn and 3 on the horizon. Each is one police force or public body using one system.

  1. United StatesDeloitte Consulting2023

    Texas Department of Public Safety — AI image classification for border wildlife cameras

    Texas border (Operation Drawbridge)

    OperationalChecked
  2. United StatesNot disclosed

    Texas Department of Criminal Justice — AI search and analytics platform to monitor border prisons and transcribe speech

    Texas

    ProposedChecked
  3. United StatesNEC (facial matching algorithm), per the DHS 2025 AI Use Case Inventory; operated by US Customs and Border Protection (cloud-based)2017

    US Customs and Border Protection — Traveler Verification Service facial matching

    United States, air land and sea ports of entry

    OperationalChecked
  4. United StatesPalantir Technologies2014

    US Immigration and Customs Enforcement — Immigration Case Management and Targeting (Palantir)

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  5. United StatesNEC, per the DHS AI inventory (CBP's vendor; ICE has no direct contract); built on CBP's Traveler Verification Service; first reported by 404 Media2025

    US Immigration and Customs Enforcement — Federal Mobile Biometric Identification (Mobile Fortify)

    Nationwide, including 287(g) partner agencies

    OperationalChecked
  6. United StatesNEC, named in the DHS 2025 AI Use Case Inventory as the vendor for CBP; built on CBP's Traveler Verification Service; app first reported by 404 Media2025

    US Customs and Border Protection — Federal Mobile Biometric Identification (Mobile Fortify)

    Nationwide, including 287(g) partner agencies

    OperationalChecked
  7. Spain2010

    Spanish National Police — Automated border control (ABC) gates with facial and fingerprint comparison

    Airports and border posts including Madrid, Barcelona, Palma, Málaga, Alicante, Tenerife Sur

    OperationalChecked
  8. Greece

    Ministry of Citizen Protection (Greece) — Automated number plate recognition at the official border entry and exit points

    ProposedChecked
  9. IcelandIDEMIA2025

    Ríkislögreglustjóri (National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police) — EU Entry/Exit System biometric border registration (facial image and fingerprints)

    Keflavík Airport, with the Suðurnes police

    OperationalChecked
  10. Sweden

    Tullverket (Swedish Customs) — ANPR cameras checking passing vehicles against the Customs database

    Sweden, fixed and mobile cameras at a number of locations

    OperationalChecked
  11. Poland

    Cyberspace Defence Forces Component Command (DKWOC), Poland — 'Inteligentna Granica' AI analysis of border sensor and drone imagery

    Eastern border with Belarus, Podlasie

    TrialChecked
  12. Romania2025

    Romanian Border Police (IGPF) — Entry/Exit System (EES) biometric border registration

    Romania, national; all border crossing points from 2 March 2026

    OperationalChecked
  13. Poland2025

    Polish Border Guard (Straż Graniczna) — Entry/Exit System (EES) biometric border registration

    Poland, national; all 71 border crossings

    OperationalChecked
  14. European UnionIDEMIA Public Security with Sopra Steria2025

    eu-LISA (EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems) — Shared Biometric Matching Service (sBMS)

    European Union and Schengen area

    OperationalChecked
  15. Poland2025

    Polish Border Guard (Straż Graniczna) — AI classification of alarms from fibre-optic detection cables on the electronic border barrier

    Podlaskie (border with Belarus)

    OperationalChecked
  16. United StatesIDEMIA (CAT-2 devices and MFACE Flex algorithm)2023

    Transportation Security Administration — Checkpoint facial recognition (Credential Authentication Technology 2, CAT-2)

    Nationwide, airport security checkpoints

    OperationalChecked
  17. United States

    US Secret Service (Uniformed Division) — Sentry mobile facial and fingerprint identification app

    Washington, D.C.

    TrialChecked
  18. United StatesClearview AI2025

    US Customs and Border Protection — Clearview AI facial recognition for national security and transnational criminal organisation investigations (Border Patrol pilot)

    Nationwide

    TrialChecked
  19. United States2011

    US Customs and Border Protection — Cargo Security Assessment Model (Automated Targeting System)

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  20. United States2023

    US Customs and Border Protection — Illicit Trade risk model for inbound cargo

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  21. United StatesManTech2017

    US Customs and Border Protection — Passport Anomaly Model

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  22. United StatesManTech2025

    US Customs and Border Protection — Trade Entity Risk Model

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  23. United StatesAltana2023

    US Customs and Border Protection — Altana entity resolution for supply-chain forced labour risk

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  24. United StatesNEC (Nippon Electric Company)2022

    US Customs and Border Protection — Unified Processing / Mobile Intake facial matching (NEC)

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  25. United StatesiProov2025

    US Customs and Border Protection — CBP Link liveness check and facial matching (iProov)

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  26. United StatesRekor2021

    US Customs and Border Protection — Land Border Integration: licence plate and occupant face recognition at land ports (Rekor)

    Land ports of entry

    OperationalChecked
  27. United StatesDHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (as listed in the inventory)2017

    US Customs and Border Protection — ERNIE analysis of radiation portal monitor data

    Ports of entry

    OperationalChecked
  28. United StatesMatroid2020

    US Customs and Border Protection — Matroid automated item of interest detection in Border Patrol imagery

    Between ports of entry

    OperationalChecked
  29. United StatesMaxar2022

    US Customs and Border Protection — KESTREL aircraft landing location predictor (Maxar)

    Air and maritime domain

    OperationalChecked
  30. United StatesRank One Computing

    US Marshals Service — JPATS mobile app biometrics (Rank One Computing)

    Nationwide

    OperationalChecked
  31. United KingdomAkhter Computers, with Cognitec as subcontractor

    Home Office — Facial age estimation for age assessment of asylum seekers

    ProposedChecked
  32. United KingdomBJSS (support contract from April 2023)

    Home Office — Identify and Prioritise Immigration Cases (IPIC)

    OperationalChecked
  33. IrelandVision-Box (Amadeus)

    Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration (Ireland) — eGates with facial comparison (Dublin Airport)

    Dublin Airport

    OperationalChecked
  34. Netherlands2012

    Koninklijke Marechaussee — Self Service Passport Control e-gates with face comparison

    Schiphol

    OperationalChecked
  35. Switzerland

    Federal Office for Customs and Border Security (BAZG) — Automatic number plate recording at border crossings

    Federal (about 170 border crossings)

    OperationalChecked
  36. GreeceIntracom Telecom2019

    Hellenic Police — Multimodal Handheld Biometric Identification

    Nationwide

    DiscontinuedChecked
  37. European Unioneu-LISA2025

    eu-LISA (EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems) — EU Entry/Exit System (EES)

    European Union and Schengen area

    OperationalChecked

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